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PROPERTY LAW—LANDLORD-TENANT LAW—THE IRON TRIANGLE OF
RESIDENTIAL LEASES: LANDLORDS, TENANTS, AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA’S LAST STATE WITHOUT IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY.
ALEXANDER APARTMENTS V. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK, 60CV-15-6339 (2017).
I. INTRODUCTION
Last among the states in its absence of an implied duty in residential
leases for landlords to repair and maintain1 their properties in habitable
condition,2 Arkansas carries forward a tradition from the Middle Ages3 in
which tenants were expected, equipped, and qualified to work their rented
lands to generate income and conduct repairs necessary to continue earning
a living.4 In the Information Age,5 residential tenants are no longer equipped
or qualified to work rented lands for income,6 instead using their rented
residences as refuges from harm. Beyond a mere embarrassment for
Arkansas, the absence of what is known as an “implied warranty of
habitability” places undue burden on tenants with carryover effects that
undermine property values,7 increase public health and related costs,8 and
lower employee productivity.9
1. Order Granting in Part & Den. in Part Tenant Intervenors’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J.
Against Alexander Apartments, LLC, Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock,
60CV-15-6339 (2017) [hereinafter Alexander Order for Intervenors].
2. Symposium, Ark. Non-Legislative Commission on the Study of Landlord-Tenant
Law, Report, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 739, 764 (2013) [hereinafter The
Commission].
3. Middle Ages, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
Middle%20Ages (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
4. Tom G. Geurts, The Historical Development of the Lease in Residential Real Estate,
32 REAL EST. L.J. 356, 356 (2004).
5. Information
Age,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/Information%20Age (last visited Dec. 29, 2018).
6. Lynn Foster, The Hands of The State: The Failure to Vacate Statute and Residential
Tenants’ Rights in Arkansas, 36 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 35 (2013).
7. See Paul Emrath, Impact of Home Building and Remodeling on the U.S. Economy 1–
5 (May 1, 2014), https://www.nahb.org/en/research/housing-economics/housings-economicimpact/impact-of-home-building-and-remodeling-on-the-u-s--economy.aspx. The inference is
clear: Remodeling increases home and property values, but allowing homes to fall into
disrepair has the opposite effect.
8. David E. Jacobs et al., The Relationships of Housing and Population Health: A 30year Retrospective Analysis, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 597, 603 (2009), https://www.ncbi
.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2679604/pdf/ehp-117-597.pdf.
9. See id. at 602; Arindrajit Dube, Eric Freeman, & Michael Reich, Employee
Replacement Costs, INST. FOR RES. ON LAB. & EMP. U.C. (2010), http://irle.
berkeley.edu/files/2010/Employee-Replacement-Costs.pdf. This note argues, among other
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In health care, the iron triangle of access, quality, and cost are equal
priorities that, when balanced, optimize the system.10 A similar triad of
interests exists in residential leases through the relationships between
landlords, tenants, and economic policy. Where the interests of one group
are skewed against the others, inefficiencies undermine the entire
relationship. This note argues in favor of the August 9, 2017 order on an
issue of first impression by the Pulaski County Circuit Court, which held
that the City of Little Rock’s (“the City”) housing code effectively operates
as an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.11 This
interpretation of the housing code compliance requirements will provide
some relief for Pulaski County tenants, advancing a portion of Arkansas law
from its current last-place position and into alignment with every other
state.12 The possibility exists that rent rates could increase13 if landlords are
required to maintain rental units in accordance with applicable housing
codes. However, the Arkansas economy will benefit overall from a reduced
public health burden14 and related economic benefits.15 Furthermore, any
increase in rent would likely be marginal, and the benefit substantially
outweighs the cost.16
This note advocates for the interpretation that the housing code creates
an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases and further
advocates for a more comprehensive and predictable statutory solution that
implements the Revised Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act
(RURLTA).17 Recognizing this interpretation and codifying it in statutory
form will bring Arkansas in line and follow the recommendations of a
comprehensive 2012 Arkansas legislative study,18 which coincides with
every other American jurisdiction.19
Arkansas courts should recognize the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s
interpretation that the housing code is an implied part of residential lease
things, that substandard housing detrimentally impacts health, which burdens businesses and
the economy through reduced productivity and increased employee replacement cost.
10. WILLIAM L. KISSICK, MEDICINE’S DILEMMAS: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS FINITE
RESOURCES 2–3 (1994).
11. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 8.
12. Id. at 6.
13. Why is Arkansas the Only State in U.S. Without this Law?, KNWA NEWS (Oct. 16,
2014),
http://www.nwahomepage.com/news/knwa/why-is-arkansas-the-only-state-in-uswithout-this-law/146701136.
14. Fact Sheet: Health and Housing, ARK. CTR. FOR HEALTH IMPROVEMENT (Mar. 2017),
http://www.achi.net/docs/462/.
15. Id.
16. See infra Section III.B.
17. See infra Section III.A.
18. The Commission, supra note 2, at 773–74.
19. See infra Section III.A.2.
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contracts, violations of which create private rights of action for tenants, and
should apply it within their respective jurisdictions. Furthermore, appellate
decisions should affirm this interpretation and apply the standard to all
jurisdictions with housing codes in Arkansas. Housing codes should be
enforced in residential leases in Arkansas to provide tenants some protection
under lease contracts and protect landlords’ investments. Implementing a
statutory implied warranty of habitability that expands existing Arkansas
landlord-tenant law to include the landlord duties under the RURLTA would
afford greater market predictability and economic benefit to the State while
also ensuring basic protections for tenants.20
Part II of this note begins with a background of landlord-tenant law in
Arkansas, including developments with the implied warranty of
habitability.21 Next, Part III discusses the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s
order construing housing codes as an implied warranty of habitability in
residential leases and the scope of the order.22 Finally, the note considers the
implied warranty of habitability from an economic perspective, analyzing
research data and comparable situations as evidenced by corporate reactions
to social issues.23 The final section incorporates additional public policy
considerations, including the extreme imbalance in the landlord-tenant
relationship that places undue burden on tenants, exposes landlords to risk,
and leaves Arkansas in last place in advancement from an agrarian society.
II. BACKGROUND
Landlord-tenant law has a long history that can be traced back to
England in the Middle Ages.24 This section gives a brief overview of the
original thinking behind landlord-tenant law and traces it through the
twentieth century. With the contextual history outlined, the section
continues with context for the development of the implied warranty of
habitability, including its expansion throughout the United States and its
history in Arkansas. The section ends with a case history of Alexander
Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock.
A.

Landlord-Tenant Law: A Brief History

Throughout the Middle Ages, tenants were expected, equipped, and
qualified to work their rented lands to generate income and conduct repairs

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section II.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section III.B.
See Geurts, supra note 4.
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necessary to continue earning a living.25 These ancient leases were both
residential and commercial in nature. As our society began to move from its
generalized agrarian roots, tenants began to specialize in trades or other
advanced roles and gradually lost the skills and time necessary to conduct
their own repairs.26 As society moved into the contemporary era, residential
tenants no longer worked land to earn income as they ventured further away
from their leased properties to carry out their specialized work.27 In contrast
with ancient leases, the contemporary leases contemplated in this note are
residential in nature and not commercial.
In the 1970s, laws began to catch up to changes in the expectations on
tenants and their relationships with rented property and landlords.28 In a
landmark federal case that recognized the fundamental shift into our
contemporary, specialized society, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held in Javins v. First National Realty that
“adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure
windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance” were
implied components of a residential lease.29 The Javins court held that “the
old no-repair rule cannot coexist with the obligations imposed on the
landlord by a typical modern housing code, and must be abandoned in favor
of an implied warranty of habitability.”30
One of the earliest examples of a court recognizing an “implied
warranty of habitability” was in Lemle v. Breeden.31 The Lemle court noted
that the tenant discovered rats not present during a move-in inspection,32
which the court found to be in violation of the contractual relationship.33
Popularized as a precedent in Javins,34 the notion of a landlord’s implied
contractual duty to repair and maintain leased residential premises was
followed by a string of other jurisdictions,35 leading to the creation of a
25. Geurts, supra note 4, at 356.
26. Id.
27. Foster, supra note 6, at 35.
28. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kline v.
Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971); Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. App. 1972);
Gillete v. Anderson, 282 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. App. 1972); Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293
N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
29. 428 F.2d at 1074.
30. Id. at 1076–77.
31. 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969); J. Clifford McKinney, II, Caveat Who?: A Review of The
Landlord/Tenant Relationship in The Context of Injuries and Maintenance Obligations, 35 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1049, 1067 (2013).
32. Lemle, 462 P.2d at 471.
33. Id. at 476.
34. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074.
35. See, e.g., Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978); Green v. Superior
Court of S.F., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351,
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Bos. Hous.
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uniform law. In 1972, the Uniform Law Commission attempted to evenly
balance the interests of landlords and tenants in the Uniform Residential
Landlord-Tenant Act (URLTA).36 Twenty-one states have enacted the
URLTA.37 An overwhelming majority of the states that have not enacted the
URLTA have nonetheless created statutory protections for tenants.38 Some
of the statutory protections are modeled after the original URLTA and
others are based on the nuanced needs of states where they are enacted.39
Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich.
App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972). See also ALA. CODE § 35-9A-204 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (West, Westlaw through 2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-1324 (West, Westlaw through 2018); CALIF. CIV. CODE § 1941, et seq. (West,
Westlaw through 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-503 (West, Westlaw through 2018);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-7 (West, Westlaw through 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 §
5305 (West, Westlaw through 2018); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14 § 301 (West, Westlaw through
2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (West, Westlaw though 2018); GA. CODE ANN., § 44-7-13
(West, Westlaw though 2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-42 (West, Westlaw through
2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-320 (West, Westlaw through 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-318-5 (West, Westlaw through 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.15 (West, Westlaw through
2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2553 (West, Westlaw through 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
383.595 (West, Westlaw through 2018); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2691 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 6021 (West, Westlaw through 2018); MD.
CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 8-211 (West, Westlaw through 2018); 105 Mass. Code Regs. §
410:351 (West, Westlaw through 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161 (West, Westlaw through 2018); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 89-8-23 (West, Westlaw through 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 441.234 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303 (West, Westlaw through 2018); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 76-1419 (West, Westlaw through 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.290
(West, Westlaw through 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-A:14 (West, Westlaw through
2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20 (West, Westlaw through 2018); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §
235-b (McKinney, Westlaw through 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-42 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-16-13.1 (West, Westlaw through 2018); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (West, Westlaw through 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118
(West, Westlaw through 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.320 (West, Westlaw through
2018); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-18-22 (West, Westlaw through 2018); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 27-40-440 (West, Westlaw through 2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-32-8 (West, Westlaw
through 2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304 (West, Westlaw through 2017); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 92.052 (West, Westlaw through 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-22-4 (West,
Westlaw through 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4457 (West, Westlaw through 2018); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-248.43 (West, Westlaw through 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060
(West, Westlaw through 2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-30 (West, Westlaw through 2018);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West, Westlaw through 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-21-1203
(West, Westlaw through 2018); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Pugh v.
Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1978).
36. See generally, UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1972), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/
urlta%201974.pdf.
37. Foster, supra note 6, at 36.
38. Id. at 36–37.
39. Id. at 37.
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The URLTA originally required landlords to comply with housing
codes related to health and safety; maintain premises in a fit and habitable
condition; keep common areas clean and safe; maintain utility infrastructure;
provide for garbage removal; and provide water, hot water, and heat.40 The
uniform law was developed with balance between the interests of tenants
and landlords in mind.41 In 2015, the Uniform Law Commission revised the
URLTA, created the RURLTA, and added requirements for landlords to
provide for “effective waterproofing and weather protection of the roof and
exterior walls;”42 reasonable measures to control vermin and prevent
exposure to hazardous substances; “floors, doors, windows, walls, ceilings,
stairways, and . . . railings” in good repair; and working locks; safety
equipment; and recycling receptacles.43 These revisions reflect
contemporary recognition of the economic44 and environmental benefits45 of
improving energy efficiency, promoting factors that contribute to health and
safety, and reducing waste.46
B.

Arkansas Landlord-Tenant Law

Arkansas remains the lone torchbearer in carrying on the ancient
tradition of casting the entire burden to repair and maintain on the tenant
while relieving the landlord of responsibility.47 In 2007, the Arkansas
General Assembly enacted the pro-landlord provisions of the URLTA but
omitted the tenant-protection provisions.48 Every other state has enacted
some form of tenant protection and many have enacted some form of
landlord protection, but Arkansas sits alone in its position of protecting only
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. REVISED UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 302 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20tenant/
RURLTA%202015_Final%20Act_2017mar30.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Packaging and Recycling, U.S. CHAMBER COM. FOUND. (2017), https://www.
uschamberfoundation.org/initiative/packaging-and-recycling.
45. RECYCLING ECONOMIC INFORMATION (REI) REPORT, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (2017), https://www.epa.gov/smm/recycling-economic-information-rei-report.
46. Benefits of Recycling, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH ENVTL. MGMT. SYS., https://nems.nih.gov/environmental-programs/Pages/Benefitsof-Recycling.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
47. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 2.
48. See Arkansas Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, No. 1004, sec. 1, 2007 Ark.
Acts 5110, 5113 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-101, et seq. (West, Westlaw through
2018)). See also Ginny Monk, ‘Habitable’ Not in Rules for State Landlords, ARK. ONLINE
(Jul. 8, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/jul/08/habitable-not-inrules-for-state-landlo/ (articulating a more comprehensive history of attempts to enact tenant
protections in Arkansas).
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landlords.49 Although the initial weight of the push to bring landlord-tenant
law in line with the other areas of the law that have recognized the balance
of interests requisite in an economically healthy society was made following
the creation of the URLTA,50 recent attention from a wide variety of
domestic and international news outlets, independent research foundations,
and human rights organizations has focused on Arkansas’s position, which
has been left behind by the rest of the country.51
In 2011, the Arkansas General Assembly created by statute a nonlegislative commission to study the state of landlord-tenant laws in
Arkansas.52 The Commission consisted of members “appointed by the
Governor, legislators, [professors from each of] the two Arkansas law
schools, [and] the Arkansas Bar Association.”53 The Commission also
included representatives from the Arkansas Realtor’s Association, Arkansas
Bankers’ Association, Landlords’ Association of Arkansas, and Arkansas
Affordable Housing Association.54 The Commission’s conclusions were
consistent with much of what has been covered by the various authors noted
previously, including that Arkansas stands alone and is considerably out of
balance with other states regarding the state of its landlord-tenant laws.55

49. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 8.
50. See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99
CAL. L. REV. 389 (2011).
51. Monk, supra note 48; Ron Wood, Renters Have Few Rights Under Arkansas Law,
ARK. ONLINE (May 7, 2017), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/may/07/rentershave-few-rights-under-arkansas-/; John Pacenti, Renters Beware: What’s That Smell?, FOX
BUS. (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/renters-beware-whats-that-smell;
Zaneta Lowe, Renters Have Few Rights in Arkansas, WREG NEWS (Feb. 5, 2015, 10:31
AM), http://wreg.com/2015/02/05/renters-have-few-rights-in-arkansas/; Eli Hager, Can You
Go to Jail for Not Paying Rent?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 16, 2015, 5:42 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/16/can-you-go-to-jail-for-not-paying-rent; Janet
Portman, Breaking Your Lease When Roaches Go Wild, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-19/classified/ct-mre-1121-renting20101119_1_landlord-roaches-habitable-premises; Christof Putzel, In Arkansas, a Real
Estate Loophole That Lets Landlords Neglect Renters, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/2016/2/in-arkansas-a-real-estateloophole-that-lets-landlords-neglect-renters.html; Spencer Chumbley & Mark Scialla,
Arkansas: Worst Place to Rent in America, VICE NEWS (June 25, 2014, 11:25 AM),
https://news.vice.com/video/arkansas-the-worst-place-to-rent-in-america; Arkansas: Tenants
Face Prosecution Over Rent Problems, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:45 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/05/arkansas-tenants-face-prosecution-over-rent-problems
[hereinafter Tenants Face Prosecution]; 10 Things Your Landlord Won’t Tell You, N.Y.
POST, (June 15, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/06/15/10-things-your-landlordwont-tell-you/ [hereinafter 10 Things Your Landlord Won’t Tell You].
52. See The Commission, supra note 2.
53. Foster, supra note 6, at 3.
54. Id.
55. The Commission, supra note 2, at 2.
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Scholarly Research and Public Attention on Arkansas LandlordTenant Law

A growing body of legal,56 public health,57 and economic research58
joins an already expansive list of public interest59 and media reporting60 on
the subject of the detrimental impacts resulting from the imbalance between
landlord and tenant interests. Scholarly legal writing from around the
country continues to analyze the absence of an implied warranty of
habitability in Arkansas.61 For example, the absence of an implied warranty
of habitability has been juxtaposed with the existence of Arkansas’s failure
to vacate and criminal eviction statutes.62 Another recent article discusses
the doctrine of caveat lessee and the obligations currently imposed on
landlords and tenants in Arkansas.63 An article by a Louisiana State
University law professor includes comparative foreign examples for
implementing the RURLTA.64 Yet another article by a Seton Hall Law
School professor discusses the continued existence of the implied warranty
of habitability and the current state of the law in the context of its
development through case law in New Jersey.65 This article is particularly
relevant in the context of this note because, as one of the earliest adopters of
56. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 6; McKinney, supra note 31; Melissa T. Lonegrass, A
Second Chance for Innovation—Foreign Inspiration for the Revised Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 905 (2013); Super, supra note 50;
Marshall Prettyman, Landlord Protection Law Revisited: The Amendments to the Arkansas
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 2007, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 18-17-101 et seq., 35 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1031 (2013).
57. See, e.g., Ashley E. Bachelder et al., Health Complaints Associated with Poor Rental
Housing Conditions in Arkansas: The Only State Without a Landlord’s Implied Warranty of
Habitability, 4 FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH 1 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC5120100/pdf/fpubh-04-00263.pdf.
58. See, e.g., MIKE ROYS, MAGGIE DAVIDSON, SIMON NICOL, DAVID ORMANDY, & PETER
AMBROSE, THE REAL COST OF POOR HOUSING 43 (2010), https://www.hud.gov
/sites/documents/REAL_COST_POOR_HOUSING.PDF.
59. Pay the Rent or Face Arrest: Abusive Impacts of Arkansas’s Draconian Evictions
Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/04/pay-rent-orface-arrest/abusive-impacts-arkansass-draconian-evictions-law [hereinafter Pay the Rent].
60. See, e.g., Monk, supra note 48; Wood, supra note 51; Pacenti, supra note 51; Lowe,
supra note 51; Hager, supra note 51; Portman, supra note 51; Putzel, supra note 51;
Chumbley & Scialla, supra note 51; Tenants Face Prosecution, supra note 51; 10 Things
Your Landlord Won’t Tell You, supra note 51.
61. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 6, at 3; Paula A. Franzese, Abbott Gorin, & David J.
Guzik, The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of LandlordTenant Reform, 68 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2016); McKinney, supra note 31, at 1069; Lonegrass,
supra note 56, at 905; Super, supra note 50, at 394.
62. Foster, supra note 6, at 20.
63. McKinney, supra note 31, at 1049.
64. Lonegrass, supra note 56, at 916–22.
65. Franzese, Gorin, & Guzik, supra note 61, at 1.
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an implied warranty of habitability interpreted in case law,66 the New Jersey
Supreme Court offers a potential template for its adoption in Arkansas.
The disparity between Arkansas’s laws and the rest of the country has
been gaining attention in national press67 and among international groups.68
Notably, an international group that monitors atrocities around the world,
including places such as Afghanistan, Russia, Rwanda, and Syria,69 reported
on the status of Arkansas’s landlord-tenant laws in 2013.70
2.

Impact of Public Pressure

This attention has placed pressure on lawmakers and elected officials in
Arkansas, leading to several attempts toward bringing Arkansas up to the
basic nationwide standards included in the RURLTA.71 As recently as 2017,
competing bills were introduced in the Arkansas General Assembly. In one
bill, sponsored by state Representative Laurie Rushing, implied quality
standards were to be applied to residential leases, including requirements for
landlords to maintain working heating, cooling, electrical, potable water,
and sewage systems in addition to a “functioning roof and building
envelope.”72 However, this bill gave landlords complete discretion over
whether the standards were met, failed to include enforcement measures,
and after its last amendment, actually deprived tenants of the meager rights
they have under constructive eviction.73 The bill failed sine die in committee
in the Arkansas Senate.74 Another another bill, sponsored by state
Representative Warwick Sabin in the same legislative session, included a
comprehensive list of provisions that reflected the landlord obligations
under the URLTA that were excluded from the 2007 enactment by the

66. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268, 276–77 (N.J. 1969).
67. Monk, supra note 48; Wood, supra note 51; Pacenti, supra note 51; Lowe, supra
note 51; Hager, supra note 51; Portman, supra note 51; Putzel, supra note 51; Chumbley &
Scialla, supra note 51; Tenants Face Prosecution, supra note 51; 10 Things Your Landlord
Won’t Tell You, supra note 51.
68. Pay the Rent, supra note 59.
69. Publications, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/publications (last visited Dec.
16, 2017).
70. Pay the Rent, supra note 59; Arkansas: Tenants Face Prosecution Over Rent
Problems, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 5, 2013, 12:45 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013
/02/05/arkansas-tenants-face-prosecution-over-rent-problems.
71. See, e.g., H.B. 1166, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); H.B. 2135, 91st
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017).
72. H.B. 1166, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (The bill failed sine die in
Senate committee.).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Arkansas legislature.75 The provisions included were substantially identical
to those required under the URLTA. Critically, Representative Sabin’s bill
specified the landlord’s rights that accompanied the implied duties and
provided procedures and remedies available to tenants in the event of
landlord oversight.76 Balancing the interests of landlords and tenants is at the
heart of the failure of these bills.
On one hand, landlords point to the risks they take in leasing their
properties, which may be damaged far beyond the dollar amount of the
security deposit.77 On the other hand, tenants and tenant groups point to the
insecurity they face at the mercy of landlords,78 who can have the ability to
unilaterally evict them for even minor infractions with no corresponding
recourse of their own.79 Tenants may also be effectively forced, because of
their options limited by income or credit, to live in uninhabitable conditions
with no legal recourse.
One of the common criticisms against implementing the tenant-friendly
portions of the RURLTA is the increased risk exposure for landlords, who
are able to provide a market of among the lowest rent costs in the United
States.80 The argument holds that bringing Arkansas landlords in line with
their interstate peers will increase their overhead costs, thus increasing rent
prices, and put Arkansas landlords at the mercy of unscrupulous tenants.81
However, the argument presumes that the market will not level itself by
attracting scrupulous tenants to improved units and implies that landlords
artificially control rent prices at their tenants’ expense. It also assumes that
all Arkansas landlords offer substandard housing requiring substantial
expense to bring it to a habitable standard. Furthermore, the Arkansas
General Assembly enacted a statute that expressly limits landlord liability in
tort.82 The effect of this statutory limit on liability in tort for landlords83 is
that most tort liability passes on to tenants, who are held to premises liability
standards for injuries sustained by licensees and invitees.84 Therefore,
75. H.B. 2135, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (The bill failed sine die in
House committee.).
76. Id.
77. See Alan Schwartz, Justice and the Law of Contracts: A Case for the Traditional
Approach, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107 (1986).
78. Pay the Rent, supra note 59.
79. Super, supra note 50, at 394.
80. The Cheapest U.S. Cities for Renters: #14. Little Rock Arkansas, CBS NEWS (Sept.
27, 2016, 6:11 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/media/cheapest-rent-housing-us-cities/8/.
81. Laura Kelton, The Top Ten Ways to Annoy Your Landlord, U. OF TENN. AT
CHATTANOOGA: THE LOOP (Sept. 19, 2009), https://blog.utc.edu/TheLoop/2009/09/19/thetop-ten-ways-to-annoy-your-landlord/.
82. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (West, Westlaw through 2018).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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minimal risk exposure exists for landlords, whose liability is limited to
circumstances where damages result from lease contract breach85 unless the
landlord agrees to maintain and repair and fails to perform in a reasonable
manner.86
C.

Case Summary: Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock

Alexander Apartments, LLC, owns an apartment complex consisting of
141 units, which has been cited by the City for numerous housing code
violations since the complex was purchased by Alexander Apartments, LLC,
in March 2014.87 On December 21, 2015, the Little Rock Fire Department
issued a notice that it intended to terminate utility services to Alexander
Apartments following repeated violations of the City’s ordinances
pertaining to housing codes88 resulting in immediate threats to health and
safety of residents.89 According to the Little Rock Fire Department,
terminating utility services meant the apartments were no longer habitable.90
Later that same day, in response to a motion for a temporary restraining
order against the City from Alexander Apartments,91 the Pulaski County
Circuit Court ruled that it lacked sufficient jurisdiction to interfere with the
fire department’s action.92 After the hearing, notice was placed on the door
of each of the residents, requiring the tenants to vacate by 5:00 p.m. on
December 28, 2015, because of the pending termination of utility services.93
1.

Tenant Intervention

The tenants intervened in the ongoing litigation between the City and
Alexander Apartments.94 The intervenors cited numerous claims against the
City, including violations of due process and federal and state laws.95 The
tenant intervenors also requested a temporary restraining order to prevent
injury in the form of losing access to their rented residences during the
85. McKinney, supra note 31.
86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (West, Westlaw through 2018).
87. Third Party Compl. & Mot. for TRO at 2, Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of
Little Rock, No. 60CV-15-6339 (Dec. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Complaint and TRO].
88. LITTLE ROCK, ARK., MUN. CODE § 8 (2018), https://library.municode.com/AR/
little_rock/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_CH8BUBURE.
89. Complaint and TRO, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. See generally, Mot. for TRO, Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock,
No. 60CV-15-6339 (Dec. 21, 2015).
92. Complaint and TRO, supra note 87.
93. Id. at 3.
94. See generally id.
95. Id. at 3.

128

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

winter and in a period of time that would have included a major holiday.96
The intervenors also cited numerous claims against Alexander Apartments,
including breach of contract,97 breach of the implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment,98 conversion,99 negligence,100 and breach of the implied warranty
of habitability.101
The intervenors filed a motion for partial summary judgment against
Alexander Apartments on the issue of the intervenors’ claim that the
minimum standards included in the City’s housing code are implicitly
included as part of residential lease agreements and thereby creates an
implied warranty of habitability in those residential lease agreements.102 The
motion included two possibilities: (1) “Local laws or ordinances establishing
minimum standards of habitability must be read into residential leases, and
by implication create a warranty of habitability in residential leases which is
measured by the standards set out in those local law[s] or ordinances;
and”103 (2) “[t]hat a general implied warranty of habitability exists in all
residential lease agreements in the State of Arkansas, regardless of the
existence of local laws or ordinances.”104
2.

Two Theories for Finding Minimum Standards in Existing Law

On the first possibility, that local laws or ordinances establish
minimum standards of habitability that must be read into residential leases,
the court began by examining the City’s Housing Code (“Code”).105 The
Code applies to all leased properties irrespective of when they were
“constructed, altered or repaired.”106 The Code requires buildings to be
maintained, safe, and sanitary, and it further stipulates that noncompliant
dwellings cannot be let or sublet.107 The court noted that the Code includes
minimum standards that “include sanitary facilities, hot and cold water
supply, water heating facilities, heating facilities, cooking and heating
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id. at 6.
98. Complaint and TRO, supra note 87, at 6.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 8.
102. See generally Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Against Alexander Apartments, LLC,
Alexander Apartments, LLC v. City of Little Rock, No. 60CV-15-6339 (Aug. 23, 2016).
103. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 1.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. at 5.
106. LITTLE ROCK, ARK., MUN. CODE § 8-330 (2018), https://library.municode.com/AR
/little_rock/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_CH8BUBURE_ARTVHOCO_DIV1
GE_S8-330SCCO.
107. Id. § 8-401.
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equipment, . . . garbage disposal facilities[,]108 . . . [l]ight and ventilation[,]109
. . . [e]lectrical systems[,]110 . . . dwelling space,”111 and structural
requirements.112
3.

Pulaski County Circuit Court Granted Summary Judgment

Considering the overwhelming weight of authority from other
jurisdictions throughout the United States, the court pointed to court
decisions from around the country in which the minimum standards in
housing codes have been interpreted as implied by operation of law in
residential housing contracts.113 In Javins, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District of
Columbia housing code created a privately enforceable duty and “that the
basic validity of every housing contract depended upon substantial
compliance with the housing code at the beginning of the lease term.”114 In
issuing its order granting summary judgment, the Pulaski County Circuit
Court acknowledged the long-held view of the Arkansas Supreme Court that
laws in existence at the time when contracts are made and performed enter
into and form part of those contracts.115 Additionally, the court pointed to
the Arkansas Supreme Court’s position that parties are presumed to contract
with existing laws in mind.116 Here, the court noted that the City’s Code in
effect at the time the tenant intervenors’ leases were entered included
minimum standards. Therefore, those requirements formed part of the lease
contracts between the tenants and Alexander Apartments.117 The ruling is
entirely consistent with the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit’s ruling in Javins and the nationwide trend toward
balancing the rights of tenants and landlords.118

108. Id. § 8-403.
109. Id. § 8-404.
110. Id. § 8-405
111. Id. § 8-406.
112. LITTLE ROCK, ARK., MUN. CODE §§ 8-421 to -435 (2018),
https://library.municode.com/AR/little_rock/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COOR_CH8
BUBURE_ARTVHOCO_DIV3MIST_PTBSTRE_S8-421FOUN.
113. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 6 (citing Javins v. First Nat’l
Realty, 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971); Hinson
v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. App. 1972); Gillete v. Anderson, 282 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. App.
1972); Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); King v. Moorehead,
495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)).
114. Id. at 7 (citing Javins, 428 F.2d 1071).
115. Id. at 8 (citing Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S.W.2d 686 (1933)).
116. Id. (citing Ellison v. Tubb, 295 Ark. 312, 749 S.W.2d 650 (1988)).
117. Id.
118. See supra Section II.A.
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The Arkansas General Assembly Bears Responsibility for
Implementing an Implied Warranty of Habitability

On the second possibility, whether a general implied warranty of
habitability exists throughout Arkansas irrespective of local ordinances, the
court noted Arkansas appellate decisions,119 which have consistently upheld
the doctrine of caveat lessee in lease contracts.120 The court noted the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s reluctance to establish a warranty of habitability
through its powers, deferring the decision to the Arkansas General
Assembly.121 The court also noted the General Assembly’s enactment of a
statute that eliminates the possibility of tort liability for landlords’ liability
to tenants or tenants’ invitees proximately caused by defects or disrepair on
a landlord’s leased property.122 Furthermore, the court acknowledged the
2007 enactment of the landlord-friendly portions of the URLTA, noting that
the pro-tenant provisions had been removed and that the 2011 NonLegislative Commission on the Study of Landlord-Tenant Law had
recommended creating implied warranty of habitability in Arkansas law.123
In acknowledging previous appellate decisions, the circuit court wrote
“Arkansas is the only state without a general warranty of habitability in all
residential lease agreements.”124
III. ARGUMENT
Although the implied warranty of habitability has been considered
from various angles in other states for more than fifty years, the concept that
housing codes constitute implied portions of residential leases is an issue of
first impression in Arkansas.125 This section considers this first issue in an
Arkansas court and weighs the health and economic impacts of
implementing the implied warranty of habitability in Arkansas.
A.

Impact as an Issue of First Impression

The Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order establishes that the minimum
standards included in the City’s housing code forms part of residential lease
119. Id. at 3 (citing Hadder v. Heritage Hill Manor, Inc., 2016 Ark. App. 303, 495 S.W.3d
628; Thomas v. Stewart, 347 Ark. 33, 60 S.W.3d 415 (2001); Propst v. McNeill, 326 Ark.
623, 932 S.W.2d 766 (1996)).
120. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 3.
121. Id. (citing Thomas, 347 Ark. 33, 60 S.W.3d 415; Propst, 326 Ark. 623, 932 S.W.2d
766).
122. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-110 (West 2016)).
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id.
125. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 5.

2018]

IRON TRIANGLE OF RESIDENTIAL LEASES

131

agreements and thereby creates an implied warranty of habitability in those
residential lease agreements.126 This is an issue of first impression in
Arkansas. Arkansas circuit courts only carry persuasive weight and not
precedential authority in other Arkansas counties. Therefore, other
jurisdictions must hear a case with similar facts before deciding on the issue
and either agreeing or disagreeing with the Twelfth Division’s
interpretation. However, appellate courts may agree with the order and
conclude that the interpretation applies to all jurisdictions in Arkansas under
contract theory, merely requiring them to enforce existing housing codes
and giving tenants a private right of action.
Approximately 44% of housing units in Little Rock, Arkansas, are
rental units, which means that more than 40,000 of the city’s 91,288 housing
units are rentals.127 Statewide, more than 34% of housing units are rental
units, which translates to nearly 465,000 of Arkansas’s 1,354,762 housing
units.128 With an average of 2.53 people per household statewide,129
approximately 1,000,000 people live in rental housing in Arkansas and more
than 100,000 of Little Rock residents live in rental units. These 1,000,000
Arkansans, who comprise more than 34% of the State’s population, are the
only renters in the United States living without basic guarantees of habitable
housing.130 The unimplemented landlord responsibility provisions of the
RURLTA, when combined with the tenant responsibilities, offer the most
balanced guidance between the interests of landlords and tenants.
1.

Health Impact of Unstandardized Housing on Arkansas Citizens

Feces and raw sewage on the floor,131 a dead cat,132 mold,133 broken
smoke detectors,134 and bed bugs135 are just some examples of actual

126. Id. at 8.
127. Quick Facts: Little Rock, Arkansas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2016), https://www.
census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/littlerockcityarkansas/PST045216.
128. Quick Facts: Arkansas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2016), https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/AR.
129. Id.
130. Alexander Order for Intervenors, supra note 1, at 8; Monk, supra note 48; Wood,
supra note 51; Pacenti supra note 51; Lowe, supra note 51; Hager, supra note 51; Portman,
supra note 51; Putzel, supra note 51; Chumbley & Scialla, supra note 51; Tenants Face
Prosecution, supra note 51; 10 Things Your Landlord Won’t Tell You, supra note 51.
131. Jason Pederson, Alexander Apartments, KATV NEWS (Nov. 14, 2014), http://katv
.com/community/7-on-your-side/alexander-apartments.
132. Chelsea Boozer, Little Rock Held Liable for Eviction Damages; Judge Says City’s
2015 Order to Leave Apartments Violated Constitution, ARK. ONLINE (Dec. 9, 2017, 4:30
AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/dec/09/lr-held-liable-for-eviction-damages201/.
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problems not only reported by tenants but also observed by housing
inspectors in Arkansas.136 As repulsive as these problems can be to current
and potential tenants,137 their detrimental effects on human health can lead to
serious problems, including respiratory ailments, headaches, high blood
pressure, and bites or infections138 in addition to the more difficult to
quantify impacts of living under stressful conditions with no way to leave.139
A University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences study compared the
substandard housing conditions with incidences of preventable but serious
health issues.140 Out of 951 Arkansas renters surveyed, more than one-third
reported unresolved repair issues with their landlords and one-quarter of
those reported experiencing health problems related to their housing
conditions.141 In the study, Hispanic tenants were 51% more likely to face
repair problems and were more likely to face a health issue than their white
counterparts.142
Scholarly research suggests that the elderly are more sensitive to their
environments compared with younger people,143 possibly putting elderly
tenants at even greater risk. Tragically, children are at the greatest risk from
environmental hazards and face exposure-related negative outcomes such as
“growth retardation, diminished IQ, precocious puberty, microcephaly, and
diminished lung volume.”144 As the economy continues to recover from the
housing market crash, people fifty-five and older have turned to the rental

133. Jonathan Rozelle, Mold in Apartment Making Resident Sick, ARK. MATTERS (Feb.
15, 2017, 7:40 PM), http://www.arkansasmatters.com/news/local-news/mold-in-apartmentmaking-resident-sick/657141628.
134. Boozer, supra note 132.
135. Why is Arkansas the Only State in U.S. Without this Law?, supra note 13.
136. Complaint and TRO, supra note 87, at 2.
137. John Lynch, Little Rock Apartments Seek up to $589,692 in Damages After City
Closed Complex, ARK. ONLINE (Dec. 12, 2017, 4:30 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.c
om/news/2017/dec/12/apartments-seek-up-to-589-692-in-damage/.
138. Bachelder et al., supra note 57, at 1–2.
139. Ginny Monk, Study Links Sick Arkansas Tenants to Run-down Apartments, ARK.
ONLINE (Jul. 8, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/jul/08/studylinks-sick-tenants-to-run-down-ap/.
140. Bachelder et al., supra note 57, at 1.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 3–4.
143. See, e.g., Suanne Iwarsson, A Long-term Perspective on Person-environment Fit and
ADL Dependence Among Older Swedish Adults, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 327, 355 (June 1, 2005);
Hans-Werner Wahl et. al, The Home Environment and Disability-related Outcomes in Aging
Individuals: What is the Empirical Evidence? 49 GERONTOLOGIST 355, 355 (June 1, 2009).
144. Cynthia Bearer, Environmental Health Hazards: How Children Are Different from
Adults, 103 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., at 10 (Sept. 1995).
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market by an increase of 29% since 2009.145 Although younger renters are
more likely to recover from illnesses from their environment, they are more
likely to rent than previous generations.146 Perhaps more significantly,
millennials—Americans born between 1981 and 1997147—have overtaken
baby boomers—Americans born between 1946 and 1964148—as the largest
living generation.149 As the number of population segments who are renters
increases, this exposes more people to the harmful effects associated with
substandard housing.
Because housing codes, where they exist, establish minimum standards
generally requiring the prevention of hazards and threats to human safety,
enforcing them through a private right of action available to tenants would
provide basic protections for people living in or considering moving to
Arkansas. However, implementing standardized minimums for ensuring the
protection of human life under residential lease contracts would offer
uniformity for courts, landlords, tenants, and enforcement mechanisms, such
as municipal inspectors or law enforcement. Such standards would also
establish uniformity for property owners statewide.
2.

Comparison with Other States

Arkansas’s implementation of only the tenant responsibility portions of
the URLTA, which includes landlord obligations, tenant obligations, and
remedies along with limitations and landlord liability,150 fell far short of the
Act’s intent of balancing the interests of landlords and tenants. Arkansas is
the only state that has not implemented any obligation to maintain minimum
standards on landlords.151 As has been discussed at length, every other state
in the union has implemented some form of protections for tenants, and
some have not implemented protections for landlords.152 Despite strong
145. Bob Sullivan, Renting is Overtaking the Housing Market. Here’s Why, USA TODAY
(Nov. 11, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/realestate/2017/11/11/renting-homes-overtaking-housing-market-heres-why/845474001/.
146. Millennials Are Driving Up the Single-Family Rental Market--Here’s Why, FORBES
(Oct.
17,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2017/10/17/
millennials-are-driving-up-the-single-family-rental-market-heres-why/#15fefff4d2a8.
147. Richard Fry, Millennials Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest Generation,
PEW RES. (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/25/millennialsovertake-baby-boomers/.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Lawrence R. McDonough, Then and Now: The Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act and the Revised Residential Landlord and Tenant Act-Still Bold and Relevant?,
35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 975, 978 (2013).
151. See supra notes 1, 2, 6, 13, 31, 35, 48, 51, 57, 59, 87, 131, 132, 133, 137, & 139.
152. Id.

134

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

support from Arkansas landlords153 and broad consensus on the need for
tenant protections,154 Arkansas stands alone as the only state without any
protections for tenants but strong protections for landlords.
B.

Economic Implications of Implementing an Implied Warranty of
Habitability in Arkansas

On a small scale, becoming a landlord may occur by circumstance, as
with an inheritance,155 marriage,156 or divorce,157 or it can occur intentionally
through purchasing an investment property or buying a new property and
retaining the previous property to lease.158 On a larger scale, an investor or
group of investors may purchase a number of single or multifamily housing
units and make a business out of providing housing to lessees.159 Absentee
ownership has been linked to a decrease in property value, increased crime,
and substantial investment to revitalize historic neighborhoods.160 In all
cases, the leased properties are investments to the owner or owners and
homes to the lessees. Because of the costs associated with not protecting
their investments, landlords should welcome minimum standards as guides
for long-term value increases of their properties.161 Furthermore, because
landlords can only recover monthly expenses or see profit returns when
properties are leased and generating revenue, occupancy rates are of critical
importance.162 Because of the costs associated with decreased occupancy
rates, it is in landlords’ best interests to maximize occupancy rates over the
153. LANDLORDS ASS’N OF ARK., LEGIS. COMMITTEE, http://www.arkansaslandlords.
org/legislative-committee (last visited Dec. 29, 2018) (“[T]he LAA is an organization of
roughly 1,000 ‘mom and pop’ landlords, with memberships in chapters across the state [,
which] support[s] . . . a Habitability Bill with minimum standard requirements that is fair to
both landlords and tenants.”).
154. The Commission, supra note 2.
155. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-201, et seq. (West, Westlaw through 2018).
156. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-101, et seq. (West, Westlaw through 2018).
157. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315. (West, Westlaw through 2018).
158. Laura Agadoni, 7 Things to Know Before Becoming a Landlord, TRULIA: BLOG (Jul.
19, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.trulia.com/blog/think-can-landlord-7-things-consider/.
159. Marty Cook, Oklahoma Investor Buys Mountain View Apartments in Fayetteville
(NWA Real Deals), ARK. BUS. (Oct. 26, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.arkansasbusiness.
com/article/107781/oklahoma-investor-buys-mountain-view-apartments-in-fayetteville.
160. Community Development Group Transforms Arkansas Town, FED. RES. BANK OF ST.
LOUIS (2000), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/bridges/fall-2000/community-develop
ment -group-transforms-arkansas-town.
161. Luke Jones, Sin City: How Apartment Managers Can Avoid Crime, Despair, ARK.
BUS. (Nov. 12, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.arkansasbusiness.com/article/88596/apartmentmanagers-face-crime-disrepair.
162. 2016 NAA Survey of Operating Expense Income & Expenses in Rental Apartment
Communities, NAT’L APARTMENT ASS’N (Aug. 2016), https://www.naahq.org/newspublications/units/august-2016/article/2016-naa-survey-operating-income-expenses-rental.
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long term.163 In the short term, occupancy results in reliable income, which
can be used to cover expenses, including maintenance. Maintaining
properties helps to retain and increase property value, which delivers an
even greater return on investment for the landlord through refinancing or
selling the property.
1.

Dispelling the Myth of Increased Rental Prices

“Lemon tenants,” or those who commit waste on leased properties, are
major sources of risk for landlords.164 It is these tenants and landlords’
corresponding desire to protect their investments that have brought about
protections in the law for landlords to mitigate potential damages caused by
tenants.165 In addition to this risk to landlords, limited evidence supports the
notion that enforcing a quality standard in housing, under specific
circumstances, could increase the cost to landlords, which would be passed
on to tenants.166 However, a quantitative study of existing literature on the
subject of the effects of housing codes on housing costs found that while a
positive correlation exists, it is limited to less than 5% and the majority of
cost increases come from building codes and zoning requirements.167
Considering Arkansas’s median gross rent price of $689 in 2016,168 even the
maximum 5% increase would only increase rent by less than $35.169
2.

Economic Benefits to Landlords

Short term costs for not repairing minor problems such as water
intrusion and electrical malfunctions can be catastrophic to landlords,
averaging $4,700 nationwide for water damage repair and mold remediation
and $10,500 to repair smoke and fire damage after a small electrical fire.170
163. Id.
164. John D. Benjamin, Kenneth M. Lusht, & James D. Shilling, What Do Rental
Contracts Reveal About Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Rental Housing Markets? 26
REAL EST. ECON. 309, 309 (1998).
165. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-110 (West, Westlaw through 2018).
166. Corbett A. Grainger, The Distributional Effects of Pollution Regulations: Do Renters
Fully Pay for Cleaner Air? 96 J. PUB. ECON. 840, 840 (2012).
167. David Listokin & David Hattis, Building Codes and Housing, 8 CITYSCAPE 1, 21
(2005), https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/cityscpe/vol8num1/ch2.pdf.
168. Quick Facts: Arkansas, supra note 128.
169. 689 * (.05) = 34.45.
170. How Much Does it Cost to Repair & Cleanup Water Damage?, HOME ADVISOR
(2007), https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/disaster-recovery/repair-water-damage/; How
Much Does it Cost to Remove Mold and Toxic Materials?, HOME ADVISOR (2017),
https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/environmental-safety/remove-mold-and-toxic-materials/;
How Much Does it Cost to Repair Fire & Smoke Damage?, HOME ADVISOR (2017),
https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/disaster-recovery/repair-fire-and-smoke-damage/.
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However, the costs of substantively correcting small problems immediately
can prevent those drastic expenses in the long term and even increase the
value of the property, preventing as much as a 10% reduction in value on
appraisal.171 A study jointly conducted by the University of Connecticut
School of Business and Syracuse University’s Department of Economics
suggests “maintenance adds roughly 1% per year to the value of the
home.”172 Investments in improvements, such as kitchen, bath, and
infrastructure upgrades, can more than offset the cost of investment in these
areas by increasing the resale value of the property.173 The value return is
often immediate.174 However, rental property investment returns are most
commonly realized in the long-term.175 Therefore, it is in the inherent
interest of landlords to ensure rental properties have no defects that could
interrupt or deter occupancy rates. If all landlords were subject to the same
minimum standards, true market competition would exist between them and
promote a positive correlation between property desirability and occupancy.
3.

Economic Benefits to Tenants

Tenants would also benefit from this structure through reduced
expenditures on repairs undertaken on their own behalf, some of which may
not meet landlord expectations and diminish property value. Tenants would
benefit from fewer interruptions to their lives, including health related issues
and missed work.176 Decreased productivity increases employee turnover,
which burdens Arkansas businesses by imposing higher training and
opportunity costs.177 Simply put, time and money spent on medical treatment
for preventable illnesses associated with poorly maintained housing are time
and money taken away from the Arkansas economy.178 These expenses

171. John Riha, How Much Does Regular Maintenance Add to Your Home?, NAT’L
ASS’N REALTORS: HOUSE LOGIC (2017), https://www.houselogic.com/organize-maintain/
home-maintenance-tips/value-home-maintenance/.
172. John P. Harding, Stuart S. Rosenthal, & C. F. Sirmans, Depreciation of Housing,
Capital, Maintenance, and House Price Inflation: Estimates from a Repeat Sales Model
(June 30, 2006), at 4, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.571.5618
&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
173. Judy Dutton, The Renovations That Will Pay Off the Most for Your Home in 2017,
REALTOR.COM (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.realtor.com/news/trends/best-and-worstrenovations -to-make-in-2017/.
174. Id.
175. John Larson, Top Reasons Why Real Estate Investing is so Popular, FORBES (Oct.
30, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2017/10/30/top-reasonswhy-real-estate-investing-is-so-popular/#21cfcaa17c53.
176. See Dube et al., supra note 9, at 2.
177. Id. at 2.
178. Id.; Jacobs et al., supra note 8, at 603.
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contribute to the need for expansion in healthcare subsidization and
decreased productivity for businesses.
4.

Benefits to the Arkansas Economy

These economic factors combine to the detriment of Arkansas and its
communities. Businesses currently in Arkansas may find their growth
restrained179 and those interested in relocating might never consider it as an
option because of its treatment of its residents.180 Issues such as the absence
of implied warranty of habitability contribute to the negative stigma
Arkansas has long fought to overcome181 and add doubt in the minds of
companies who might otherwise plant seeds of investment in its fertile
ground.182
Economics research by the National Bureau of Economic Research has
shown that improved “health has a positive and statistically significant
effect on economic growth.”183 The research suggests that improving a
person’s life expectancy by one year contributes to a 4% increase in
output.184 This means a mere one-year increase in the life expectancy of the
one million Arkansans who lease their residences could unlock $1.65
billion.185 If the study’s results carry beyond the initial year, the
compounding impact on Arkansas’s economy could be enormous.

179. Jim Carlton, Housing Crunch Threatens Reno’s Tech Boom, FOX BUS. (Apr. 20,
2017),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/04/20/housing-crunch-threatens-renostech-boom.html (The article points to a lack of adequate housing as a restraint on growth
potential, but the principle that disruption in housing prevents worker availability and
consequently prevents smooth business operation and growth holds true in both contexts.).
180. Dan Schulman, PayPal Withdraws Plan for Charlotte Expansion, PAYPAL (Apr. 5,
2016), https://www.paypal.com/stories/us/paypal-withdraws-plan-for-charlotte-expansion.
181. C. Fred Williams, Arkansas’s Image, ENCYCLOPEDIA ARK. HIST. & CULTURE (May
5, 2017), http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?entryID=1.
182. Nathan Layne, Wal-Mart Support of Gay Rights Turns on Business, REUTERS (Apr.
2, 2015, 6:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-arkansas-analysis/wal-martsupport-of-gay-rights-turns-on-business-idUSKBN0MT13E20150402.
183. David E. Bloom, David Canning, & Jaypee Sevilla, The Effect of Health on
Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. 5 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8587, 2001), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w8587.pdf.
184. Id.
185. Regional Facts: Arkansas, U.S. BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://bea.gov/regional/bearfacts/pdf.cfm?fips=05000&areatype=STATE&geotype=3 (The
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis reported Arkansas’s gross
domestic product for 2016 as $121.4 billion. Because renters comprise approximately 34% of
Arkansas’s population, increasing their productivity by 4% would contribute to an overall
gross domestic product increase of $1.65 billion.).
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Considering corporate reactions186 to more divisive social issues, such
as transgender bathrooms and laws denying discrimination protection on the
basis of sexual orientation,187 the economic downsides in the form of lost
opportunity costs188 and businesses overlooking Arkansas are potentially
staggering.189 For example, the opportunity cost North Carolina lost during
its highly publicized transgender bathroom debate190 included an initial
investment of between $77 million and $201 million, $42 million annually
in salaries, and 650 jobs.191 Although such specific examples are not readily
available for Arkansas, its tourism industry alone attracts $7.2 billion
annually.192 Damage to the Arkansas tourism industry and its associated jobs
may serve as an indicator of other businesses opting to look elsewhere when
making their decision to open a new location or headquarters.193 Those

186. See Schulman, supra note 180.
187. See Jonathan M. Katz & Erik Eckholm, Anti-Gay Laws Bring Backlash in
Mississippi and North Carolina, N.Y TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/04/06/us/gay-rights-mississippi-north-carolina.html;
Garrett
Epps,
Public
Accommodations and Private Discrimination, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/public-accommodations-and-privatediscrimination/390435/.
188. Tasneem Nashrulla, Here’s Everyone Who Refuses to Work in North Carolina and
Mississippi Over Anti-LGBT Laws, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 20, 2016, 9:37 AM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/tasneemnashrulla/here-are-the-people-and-companies-that-refuseto-work-in-nor?utm_term=.rfBWn6PNPD#.nf8G3E7O7o.
189. U.S. CONGRESS JOINT ECON. COMMITTEE DEMOCRATIC STAFF, THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY
(Nov. 2013), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/8e0d743a-ec6b-4474-88e77e59e3938cd9/enda---final-11.5.13.pdf.
190. North Carolina Transgender ‘Bathroom Bill’ Flushed by Lawmakers, FOX NEWS
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/north-carolina-transgender-bathroombill-flushed-by-lawmakers.
191. Will Doran, North Carolina Economic Official Says HB2 Has Not Harmed the State
Economy, POLITIFACT (Oct. 28, 2016, 8:40 AM), http://www.politifact.com/northcarolina/statements/2016/oct/28/john-skvarla/top-north-carolina-economic-official-says-hb2has-/.
192. Wesley Brown, Arkansas Tourism Industry Hopes to Build Off Two-Year ‘Hot
Streak,’ May Face Some Economic Headwinds in 2017, TALK BUS. & POL. (Jan. 23, 2017,
11:37 AM), https://talkbusiness.net/2017/01/arkansas-tourism-industry-hopes-to-build-offtwo-year-hot-streak-may-face-some-economic-headwinds-in-2017/.
193. Jill Disis, The Controversy That Could Hold Back Some Amazon HQ2 Contenders,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 7, 2017, 1:03 PM), http://money. cnn.com/2017 /11/07/technology/
business/amazon-hq2-state-laws/index.html; Rick Morgan, Atlanta bid for Amazon HQ2 gets
new political problem: Georgia Adoption Bill, CNBC (Feb. 23, 2018, 5:22 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/23/atlanta-bid-for-amazon-hq2-didnt-need-georgia-anti-lgbtadoption-bill.html.
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social concerns may be mere indicators of a looming change in corporate
thinking from short-term gains to long-term impact.194
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite Arkansas’s entrepreneurial spirit that surely carries forward
from its origins on America’s frontier, the State carries reputational baggage
that weighs heavily in the minds of companies that might otherwise consider
Arkansas in their expansion plans.195 This baggage, one form of which is the
unwillingness to adopt even the most basic of protections for renters, weighs
on the minds of employers who increasingly consider employee happiness
as part of their business calculus. Arkansas will likely never even cross these
employers’ minds as they look to better reputations and more inviting places
from which to conduct their business.
This is an easy fix. Arkansas should follow the longstanding trend
among every other state by enacting statutes that make basic moral,
religious, and economic sense by ending the archaic tradition of forcing
tenants to improve and maintain landlords’ property investments. In the
near-term, Arkansas courts should adopt the approach taken by the
Alexander court and uphold existing laws, regulations, and ordinances.
Arkansas appellate courts should recognize this approach and apply it
statewide as a private right of action under contract theory.
Enforcing housing codes and enabling private rights of action for
tenants encourages landlords to maintain their investments for their own
economic gain and for the betterment of tenants. Landlords will suffer from
fewer interruptions to their leases, enjoy increased and sustained occupancy
rates, and enjoy increases in property values as the overall market increases
194. BlackRock CEO to Companies: Pay Attention to Societal Impact, FOX BUS. (Jan. 17,
2018), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/blackrock-ceo-to-companies-pay-attention-tosocietal-impact.
195. See, e.g., Disis, supra note 193; Doran, supra note 191; Hayley Miller, HRC
Announces 60 Companies Launch Business Coalition for the Equality Act, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.hrc.org/press/hrc-announces-60-companies-launchbusiness-coalition-for-the-equality-act.
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in value. Beyond the economic benefit to landlords, the state and its
businesses will benefit from more stable employees, who will suffer from
fewer distractions of threats to their health and safety in their rented
residences. Balancing the interests of all parties will unlock untapped
potential in the Arkansas residential lease market and make Arkansas a more
appealing choice for businesses interested in expanding operations.
Wesley N. Manus*

